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This paper attempts to answer the following question: If the HIPC Initiative is fully
successful and managed to write-off all debt that is owed by Africa, will the debt
problem be over? The answer is ‘no’. This pessimist answer is arrived at by examining
the historical origin of African debt and the structural problems the continent is
confronted with. The literature about the origins of the African debt crisis lists a
number of factors as its cause. The oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79, the
expansion of the Eurodollar, a rise in public expenditure by African governments
following rising commodity prices in early 1970s, the recession in industrial countries
and the subsequent commodity price fall, and a rise in real world interest rate are
usually mentioned as major factors. Surprisingly, almost all the literature starts its
analysis either in the early 1970s or, at best, after independence in 1960s. The main
argument in this paper is that one has to go beyond this period not only to adequately
explain the current debt crisis but also to propose its possible solution. The conclusion
that emerges from such analysis is that the African debt problem is essentially a trade
problem. Thus, long-run solution to debt points to the importance of addressing trade
and trade related structural problems in the continent.
Keywords: debt, trade, Africa
JEL classification: F1, F34, F35, N77, E44UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of
the Institute is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on
structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, to
provide a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and
environmentally sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening
and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Its work is
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through
networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors,
of any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 92-9190-192-X (printed publication)
ISBN 92-9190-193-8 (internet publication)1
1 Introduction
Notwithstanding the highly publicized debt relief initiative of the highly indebted poor
countries (HIPC), the African debt problem is one among a myriad of problems the
continent is facing. A number of studies, in particular on the debt of the Latin American
countries, have attempted to explain the origin of the debt crisis. This literature
attributes the developing countries’ debt (including that of Africa) to shocks generated
in the early 1970s. In this paper an attempt is made to explain the historical origin of
the African debt crisis. It is argued that understanding the African debt and proposing
its solution requires understanding its historical origin. The paper is organized as
follows. In section 2 an attempt to provide a brief summery of the policy debate on the
African economic crisis is given. This is primarily intended to show the general context
under which the debt problem is understood by major institutions. This is followed by
section 3 where the external finance problems of Africa will be described. Section 3
focuses on the structure of the African economies created by its colonial history and its
impact on the current debt problem. Section 4 examines the evolution of the debt
problem from 1970s onward. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background on African debt and macro policy debate
2.1 Africa’s economic crisis: What caused it?
There are three sets of contending explanations for Africa’s economic crisis. The first is
set out in the 1981 World Bank An Agenda for Action (also known as the Berg Report)
and a number of subsequent World Bank publications. An alternative explanation,
associated with the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA 1989a) is outlined in
the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs (AAF-SAP).
Finally, there exists a third view, which is less clearly associated with any particular
institution and is largely held by academics of a Marxist orientation. This is often
offered as a critique to the other two explanations. Although the scope of all three sets
of explanations is general and encompass every aspects of the African economic crisis,
we focus mainly on how problems in the external sector of the economy are explained.
Nevertheless, by referring to this wider debate, we aim to locate the problems and the
role of the external sector in a wider context.
The Agenda for Action (1981) argues that Africa’s problems relate to underdeveloped
human resources, political fragility, problems of restructuring colonial institutions,
inheritance of poorly shaped economies, climate, geography and population growth. Set
in the context of these problems, the disappointing performance of the external sector
is, perhaps, a little more understandable. The Bank argues that in spite of external
shocks associated particularly with the rise in oil prices in 1973-74 and 1978-80 and a
decline in world demand for primary commodities, the balance-of-payments problems
experienced by most African nations since the 1970s generally cannot be attributed to
deterioration in terms of trade.1 With the exception of mineral exporters, it is suggested
1 However, the Bank acknowledges that many African nations were faced with unfavourable terms of
trade during the early 1980s.2
that terms of trade for most African nations have, in fact, been either favourable or
neutral.2
The main cause of the balance-of-payments problem, according to the Bank, has been a
decline in the volume of exports. The decline in the terms of trade faced by African
nations is attributed to three factors. First, structural changes in the composition of
world trade; trade in commodities growing at a slower rate than that of manufactures
has resulted in a decline in the African share of total world trade. Second, drought and
civil strife have negatively affected Africa’s supply capacity. And third, trade
restrictions and agricultural subsidy policies of the industrial countries represent a
barrier to African trade.3 The Bank goes on to argue that the failure of Africa’s export
sector may be explained in terms of three main factors. First, government policy has
tended to be biased against agricultural and export production. Second, the increased
consumption associated with rapid population growth has placed a burden on resources,
which might otherwise have been used by the export sector. And third, inflexibilities in
the African economies are seen as an obstacle to diversification. The Bank’s insistence
that policy failure represents the main explanation for Africa’s economic crisis, and the
consequent emphasis on the need for reforms, have continued in the publication of its
long-term perspective study (World Bank 1989). Moreover, as recently as 1994, the
Bank continued to argue that orthodox macroeconomic management represents the road
to economic recovery in Africa and, hence, more adjustment, not less, is required
(World Bank 1994). This assertion has been the subject of criticism, coming from a
host of different sources (see inter alia Adam 1995; Mosley et al. 1995; Lall 1995).4
A number of other analysts have arrived at conclusions in line with those of the Bank.
Van Arkadie (1986), while sympathetic to the problems posed by external shocks,
argues that stagnating or falling output has had an important impact on export earnings.
On the latter point the World Bank (1989) argues rather vigorously that declining
export volumes, rather than declining prices, account for Africa’s poor export revenue.
Grier and Tullock’s (1989) analysis supports this view. Based on their survey of
empirical studies into the causes of the African economic crisis, Elbadawi et al. (1992)
also found domestic policies to be important. White (1996b), citing the case of Zambia,
argues that economic decline following the country’s independence may largely be
attributed to economic mismanagement. Using a simple pooled multiple regression
equation for 33 African countries, Ghura (1993) also finds significant support for the
Bank/IMF viewpoint. Easterly and Levine (1996) suggest political instability, low
levels of schooling, deterioration in infrastructure, as well as policy failures as possible
2 In subsequent publications, notably Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s published jointly
with UNDP, the Bank argues forcefully that Sub-Saharan Africa has been in relatively ‘good shape’
compared to other parts of the developing world and that policy mistakes have been the principal
cause of its economic crisis. However, the ECA (1989b) argues that the Bank has based its
conclusions on ‘pseudo-statistics’ and selective reporting. Re-examination of the data by ECA
analysts would tend to suggest that the Bank’s argument cannot be substantiated (see ECA 1989b and
Mosley and Weeks 1993 for a brief summary).
3 However, according to the Bank, the effects of the protectionist policies of developed nations may be
rendered less significant due to the low capacity of African manufacturing, the inability to produce
temperate products as well as the continent’s preferential status within the EEC. See also Amjadi
et al. (1996) for a recent argument along these lines as well as proposals for possible policy
conditionality plan for privatizing African shipping lines.
4 See White (1996a) for a review of this debate.3
causes of Africa’s growth problems. They conclude, however, that policy
improvements alone are likely to boost growth substantially. (See also Collier and
Gunning 1999 for a similar argument.) Although the above survey is not exhaustive,
the aforementioned works would tend to lend strong support to the Bank/Fund’s
viewpoint. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this survey, therefore, is that the
remedy to Africa’s economic problems is to implement structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs).
In contrast, the ECA (1989a) prefers to explain Africa’s problems in terms of
deficiencies in basic economic and social infrastructure (especially physical capital),
research capability, technological know-how and human resource development,
compounded by problems of socio-political organization. The ECA sees inflation,
balance-of-payments deficit, a rising debt burden and instability of exports as resulting
from a lack of structural transformation, unfavourable physical and socio-political
environment, as well as an excessive outward orientation and dependence. The ECA
study suggests that weaknesses in Africa’s productive base, the predominant
subsistence and exchange nature of the economy and its openness (to international trade
and finance) have all conspired to perpetuate the external dependence of the continent.
Hence, one of the striking features of the African economy is the dominance of the
external sector. This has the effect of rendering African countries quite vulnerable to
exogenous shocks.5 Consequently, according to the ECA viewpoint, perceiving African
problems in terms of internal and external balance problems and seeking a solution
within that framework (most notably through the implementation of structural
adjustment programmes) implies not only the wrong diagnosis but also the wrong
treatment. The ECA study argues that ‘... both on theoretical and empirical grounds, the
conventional SAPs are inadequate in addressing the real causes of economic, financial
and social problems facing African countries that are of a structural nature’ (ECA
1989a: 25).
Based on this alternative diagnosis and the major objectives of the Lagos Plan of
Action (OAU 1981), the ECA formulated an African alternative framework to the
Bank/Fund’s policy recommendations. The ECA framework focuses on three
dynamically interrelated aspects, which need to be taken into account:
i) The operative forces (political, economic, scientific and technological,
environmental, cultural and sociological);6
ii) The available resources (human and natural resources, domestic saving and
external financial resources); and
iii) The needs to be catered for (i.e. focusing on vital goods and services as
opposed to luxuries and semi-luxuries).
The adoption of this general framework would allow the different categories of
operative forces to influence not only the level and structure of what is produced but
also the distribution of wealth. Moreover, these forces may then influence the nature of
5 In contrast, Collier and Gunning (1999) argue that the lack of openness represents one of the major
causes of poor performance of African economies.
6 This basically includes the system of government, public enterprises, the private sector, domestic
markets, research and development, forces of nature and climate, ethnicism and society’s value
system, external commodity markets and finance and transnational corporations.4
the needs to be catered for and the degree of their satisfaction. At a concrete level this is
envisaged to include a number of policy directions. First, improving production
capacity and productivity, mobilization and efficient use of resources, human resource
development, strengthening the scientific and technological base, and vertical and
horizontal diversification. Second, improving the level and distribution of income,
adopting a pragmatic balance between the public and private sectors, putting in place
‘enabling conditions’ for sustainable development (particularly economic incentives
and political stability), shifting of (non-productive) resources, and improving income
distribution among various groups. And, finally, focusing on the required needs,
particularly in relation to food self-sufficiency, reducing import dependence,
re-alignment of consumption and production patterns, and managing of debt and debt
servicing.
Just as many have argued in favour of the Bank/IMF view, so too have many analysts
come out to support the ECA’s position. Thus, various studies have emphasized
Africa’s extreme dependence on primary commodity exports (see Ngwenya and
Bugembe 1987; Fantu 1992; Adedeji 1993; Alemayehu 2002). Setting this discussion
in a broader historical context, these studies have highlighted the impact of colonialism
in establishing the rules by which Africa might participate in the world economy.
According to these rules, African nations produced raw materials and agricultural
goods for Europe’s industries. Further, it is argued that this pattern of trade has changed
very little since the time of political ‘independence’ (Fantu 1992; Adedeji 1993).
Indeed, Stefanski (1990) argues that understood in the context of direct continuum with
the colonial experience, Africa’s economy still depends on external factors to a much
greater degree than any other developing region. As a result of this dependence,
Africa’s economic crisis is seen as being intricately interconnected with external factors
such as falling terms of trade, declining demand for African exports and related
external shocks (Stefanski 1990; Adedeji 1993). Collier (1991) also argues that abrupt
external shocks (be they negative or positive) have represented important causes of the
poor long-term economic performance of Africa.7 Ali (1984) has touched on another
dimension of the problem. He argues that for most African nations, the mitigation of
their problems depends not only on the characteristics of the commodities they export
(and specifically their elasticities) but also on the presence or absence of the necessary
market staying power. Wheeler (1984) has made an exploratory econometric analysis
of the sources of stagnation and suggests that ‘environmental’ factors (especially terms
of trade and international conditions of demand) have had a greater impact on growth
than policy variables. Indeed, based on Ghura’s recent econometric analysis (1993),
world interest rates represent a further significant variable, which should be added to
Wheeler’s list of adverse ‘environmental’ factors.8
7 Collier (1991) cites the Zambian economy and copper price as a classic example of negative shocks.
In Collier’s opinion two errors are made: first, the price fall was treated as temporary, and second,
foreign exchange shortages were handled by rationing. Notwithstanding an acknowledgement of the
effect of negative shocks, he emphasized poor policies in what he called ‘controlled’ economies as
representing a major problem. However, it could be argued that the root cause of these policy
problems lies in the structure of the economy of these countries, and in their external trade in
particular. Taken in this light, policy problems, per se, may be of only secondary importance.
8 However, Ghura (1993) is extremely optimistic in stating that judicious macro and trade policies may
stimulate growth in Africa, even if external conditions do not improve. This viewpoint is essentially
similar to the types of empirical studies undertaken in support of Bank-type policies.5
The negative impact of dependence on the exports of primary commodities is reflected
in three interdependent phenomena:
i) A decline in prices faced by exporters (‘terms of trade’);
ii) Instability of exports earnings; and
iii) An absolute decline in levels of demand and supply.
Attempts to compensate for the deterioration in the exchange rate faced by exporters by
increasing supply have resulted in a further decline in prices (Fantu 1992; Stefanski
1990; Stein 1977). Stein (1977) examined export trends in East Africa (Uganda, Kenya
and Tanzania) to determine the causes of the divergence of each country’s export
growth from that of the world. He finds that unfavourable commodity composition9—
as opposed to the favourable/unfavourable nature of its market and increased
competitiveness—went a long way in accounting for this divergence. Because African
countries depend on a few commodities whose prices swing cyclically and may decline
over time, these countries face export-earning instability. Naturally, such instability
adversely affects their economies. However, Fosu (1991) examining the evidence for
Sub-Saharan Africa argues that export instability per se is less important than
fluctuation in capital formation (capital instability) in affecting economic growth. Yet
as his own work shows, high export instability in Sub-Saharan Africa may render
export proceeds a relatively unreliable source for funding investment projects. This
usually forces countries to depend on external finance (discussed at length below).
The third view differs from the other two in its understanding of what crisis means in
the African context. For these analysts a crisis ‘... has a connotation of systemic
breakdown, but more generally it can refer to a moment or a specific time period in the
history of a system at which various developments of a negative character combine to
generate a serious threat to its survival’ (Lawrence 1986: 2). Sutcliffe (1986), for
instance, argues that the African crisis represents the continuation of a complex process
of polarization trends. It emanates from Africa’s economic dependence. For him, the
African crisis is best understood in terms of the combined result of long-term secular
effects of imperialism suddenly aggravated by the impact of a global capitalist crisis.
Thus, according to these viewpoints, Africa’s problems are best understood as resulting
from long-term underdevelopment, following dependency theory,10 and short-term
vulnerability, following international aspects of crisis theory (Amin 1974a and 1974b;
Ake 1981 cited in Ofuatey-Kodjoe 1991; Sutcliffe 1986; Harris 1986; Onimode 1988;
Moyo et al. 1992). In general, these writers are against the view that there is a ‘norm’
from which African countries are in a temporary deviation with the associated
implications and that these countries may return to that norm given a particular
adjustment measure (Harris 1986). Harris and Mamdani, for instance, argue that the
IMF and Bank’s ultimate objective is not to correct distortions in a free market
international system, but to construct such a system (Harris 1986). In doing so, these
9 This is measured as the divergence in the rate of growth of a country’s exports from that of the world
as a whole over the period under study, multiplied by the total exports of the country in question.
This is taken from a simple model, which specifies the different factors affecting exports (see Stein
1977).
10 See Leys (1996) and Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1991) for critiques of the dependency theory in the African
context.6
institutions may undermine any attempt to create an independent, integrated and self-
sustained (African) economy (Mamdani 1994).
While there are areas where the first two approaches both converge and diverge, the
third explanation for Africa’s economic crisis firmly opposes both. Thus, the core of
the disagreement between the views of the Bank and ECA centres on ‘the role of the
market’ mechanism11 (Oskawe, quoted in Asante 1991: 179). While the Bank believes
the market mechanism to represent the fundamental instrument of resource allocation
and income distribution, the ECA questions this viewpoint. Thus, while the Bank
focuses mainly on financial balances, the ECA considers a much broader
transformation as an enabling condition for the former. The Bank emphasizes the
export sector, but the ECA strategy advocates selectivity (see also Asante 1991). While
the Bank expresses concern about anti-export bias and population policy, the ECA
prefers to emphasize the need to ensure total structural transformation and food self-
sufficiency. While the Bank places more emphasis on short-term policies than on
Africa’s long-term needs, the ECA strategy (as defined in the Lagos Plan of Action)
stresses the importance of also addressing issues of long-term transformation along
with these short-term policies.12 However, these institutions do agree on some major
issues, such as the need for human resource development, improving the efficiency of
parastatals, and sound debt management. The ECA analysis is quite comprehensive in
addressing the causes of the crisis and in suggesting not only short-run solutions but
also a framework for long-term transformation.13 Thus, the analysis of the external
sector of Africa adopted in this study is conducted within this broader context. Within
this perspective, it is not difficult to show that the African debt crisis has developed as
part of the broader external economic problem of the continent.
2.2 Background on the African debt
One of the major external problems of African countries is external financing in general
and the debt crisis in particular. As can be seen from Table 1, Africa’s total external
debt grew nearly 25 fold from a relatively low level of US $12.6 billion in 1971 to
nearly US $300 billion today. The most important component of this foreign burden is
outstanding long-term debt. The use of IMF credit became important in the late 1970s
and early 1980s when structural adjustment and enhanced structural adjustment
facilities became significant components of flows to Africa.
11 Makandawire (1989 cited in Elbadawi et al. 1992) summarizes the two contending views about the
cause of African crisis as structuralist and neoclassical. He notes:
The structuralist view is one which highlights a number of features and ‘stylized facts’ that almost
every point contradicts the neoclassical view ... class based distribution of income rather than
marginal productivity based distribution of income; oligopolist rather than the laissez-faire capitalist
market; increasing returns or fixed proportion functions rather than ‘well-behaved’ production
functions with decreasing returns and high rates of substitution; non-equivalent or ‘unequal
exchange’ in the world rather than competitive, comparative advantage based world system; low
supply elasticities rather than instantaneous response to price incentives.
12 See Stewart (1993) for a discussion of this issue.
13 See, however, Helleiner (1993) who argues for an emerging consensus on this issue.Table 1
Major debt indicators of Africa (in billions of US dollars, unless otherwise stated)
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total external debt stock (EDT)
East and Southern Africa (ESA) 4.9 11.4 28.3 55.4 85.2 88.8 91.1 93.4 101.4 106.0 104.0 103.2 107.3
North Africa (NA) 5.1 12.9 51.3 75.0 93.0 90.9 88.7 86.7 94.1 99.6 98.0 92.2 94.4
West and Central Africa (WCA) 3.9 8.2 32.2 51.7 91.7 94.2 90.9 94.7 98.2 103.9 101.7 94.5 98.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.8 19.7 60.8 107.1 176.9 183.4 182.7 194.8 221.3 235.4 231.8 223.1 230.1
All Africa 13.9 32.6 112.1 182.1 269.8 274.2 271.4 281.5 315.4 335.0 329.9 315.3 324.5
Long-term external debt (total, all Africa) 11.9 27.2 84.6 140.1 227.7 231.7 227.2 234.0 253.0 266.9 260.9 249.2 256.3
Multilateral (DOD)
East and Southern Africa 0.5 1.4 4.0 8.9 18.9 20.7 21.5 23.4 25.9 27.7 28.0 28.0 29.8
North Africa 0.2 0.6 4.1 7.2 12.4 13.8 14.2 15.4 17.0 18.4 18.2 17.2 18.5
West and Central Africa 0.5 1.2 3.6 7.8 19.4 20.9 21.7 22.8 25.3 27.1 26.7 25.6 27.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 2.6 7.6 16.7 38.2 41.6 43.2 46.1 51.2 54.7 54.7 53.6 57.0
All Africa 1.2 3.2 11.7 23.9 50.6 55.4 57.4 61.4 68.2 73.0 72.9 70.7 75.6
Bilateral
East and Southern Africa 2.6 5.0 11.1 23.7 36.6 37.3 37.2 36.8 39.2 40.0 39.5 38.2 39.8
North Africa 3.0 6.0 17.5 31.9 36.6 37.8 38.2 38.1 44.4 49.8 50.7 48.0 49.1
West and Central Africa 2.0 3.2 6.9 10.5 33.9 36.7 37.1 37.0 40.4 42.8 41.2 38.7 40.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 8.3 18.1 34.2 70.5 74.0 74.4 73.8 79.6 82.7 80.7 77.0 80.5
All Africa 7.6 14.3 35.6 66.1 107.2 111.7 112.6 111.9 124.0 132.6 131.4 125.0 129.7
Private creditors (DOD)
East and Southern Africa 1.1 2.6 5.4 8.6 13.3 13.3 13.0 13.0 12.9 13.5 12.6 12.6 12.3
North Africa 1.2 4.8 21.0 23.8 34.5 30.8 29.0 27.3 26.1 24.5 21.5 18.7 17.6
West and Central Africa 0.7 2.3 10.8 17.6 22.1 20.2 14.5 14.6 13.9 13.4 12.2 10.6 10.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.9 4.9 16.3 26.3 35.4 33.9 28.2 33.4 34.6 36.8 35.1 34.7 33.6
All Africa 3.0 9.7 37.3 50.1 69.9 64.7 57.2 60.7 60.8 61.3 56.6 53.4 51.1
Interest and principal arrears (%of total external debt)
East and Southern Africa 0.3 3.6 10.3 16.4 21.1 25.2 28.4 32.5 34.0 36.7 35.0 34.2 35.4
North Africa 1.5 0.2 0.9 6.9 6.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
West and Central Africa 2.8 3.9 1.6 3.1 9.6 10.3 14.1 19.2 19.5 21.9 23.8 22.7 25.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.4 3.7 5.6 10.0 15.2 17.5 21.2 25.0 24.2 26.3 26.2 25.5 27.5
All Africa 1.4 2.3 3.5 8.7 12.1 12.0 14.4 17.4 17.1 18.6 18.6 18.2 19.6
Source: World Bank ‘Global Development Finance’ (2000).
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Major debt indicators of Africa (in billions of US dollars, unless otherwise stated)
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Net transfer on debt
East and Southern Africa 1.09 2.19 2.48 2.49 2.07 0.80 2.45 0.84 -0.04 0.47 -0.45 1.65 -1.32
North Africa 0.54 4.68 2.25 -0.06 -5.64 -3.39 -5.71 -5.85 -2.80 -3.33 -3.58 -4.86 -5.97
West and Central Africa 0.40 1.12 4.01 -1.89 -0.27 -2.22 -2.02 0.83 -2.80 -0.57 -1.33 0.31 -3.28
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.50 3.31 6.56 0.55 1.78 -1.18 0.74 2.53 5.48 2.01 -2.57 0.15 -6.48
All Africa 2.04 7.99 8.81 0.49 -3.86 -4.57 -4.98 -3.32 2.68 -1.32 -6.15 -4.71 -12.45
Aggregate net transfer
East and Southern Africa 1.08 2.30 4.18 5.37 7.62 7.57 7.55 6.46 5.66 5.76 3.77 5.37 4.13
North Africa 0.46 5.19 2.95 2.60 3.08 0.54 -0.75 -1.80 0.39 -1.54 -0.23 0.29 -2.20
West and Central Africa 0.29 1.14 1.16 -1.28 2.32 1.80 1.49 4.19 5.45 3.05 2.77 2.52 1.95
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.43 3.41 5.11 4.44 9.23 8.97 8.83 10.21 11.75 15.36 8.66 13.33 6.68
All Africa 1.90 8.60 8.06 7.04 12.31 9.51 8.08 8.41 12.14 13.81 8.43 13.61 4.48
Technical cooperation grants (as percentage of total grants)
East and Southern Africa 61.81 36.39 36.77 32.06 24.31 25.61 26.44 28.94 24.26 29.06 33.98 31.25 24.94
North Africa 38.70 16.33 58.53 39.71 20.31 22.50 31.49 52.21 38.85 51.19 40.04 43.32 33.25
West and Central Africa 51.54 46.90 54.37 36.61 30.04 31.78 35.62 37.18 26.81 32.06 30.01 32.53 28.86
Sub-Saharan Africa 61.36 49.23 42.60 35.52 29.76 31.79 32.91 33.86 28.45 30.70 32.69 31.30 27.82
All Africa 50.03 32.78 50.57 37.61 25.04 27.14 32.20 43.04 33.65 40.94 36.36 37.31 30.53
Debt (EDT)/GNP (%)*
East and Southern Africa 19.87 23.12 44.32 77.66 99.45 94.71 115.66 116.12 141.51 133.18 114.93 103.40 111.55
North Africa 29.33 31.56 57.07 84.27 71.98 75.11 68.30 67.02 69.68 68.75 61.36 58.15 55.81
West and Central Africa 21.35 27.61 59.61 106.68 121.16 127.89 147.63 167.20 158.63 145.95 146.27 163.02
Sub-Saharan Africa 14.55 15.52 23.45 56.37 63.01 63.68 62.91 70.99 82.57 77.57 73.82 67.74 72.32
All Africa 21.94 23.54 40.26 70.32 67.50 69.39 65.61 69.00 76.13 73.16 67.59 62.94 64.07
Debt service ratio (%)*
East and Southern Africa 8.54 9.63 14.23 21.89 20.87 21.73 18.79 17.55 14.86 21.26 15.26 12.39 15.49
North Africa 21.77 8.52 22.27 30.24 32.96 34.58 37.21 36.49 29.86 24.48 21.15 20.10 22.38
West and Central Africa 5.28 6.88 13.16 22.08 19.29 18.12 15.83 14.52 21.12 18.98 18.39 15.92 17.08
Sub-Saharan Africa .. .. 7.20 17.58 12.92 12.46 12.28 9.20 14.57 15.29 14.22 14.72 14.68
All Africa .. .. 14.73 23.91 22.94 23.52 24.74 22.84 22.21 19.88 17.69 17.41 18.53
Notes: * Simple arithmetic mean (based on those countries that have relevant data; Net transfer = Loan disbursements less amortization and interest payment [as
defined in World Debt Tables]; Aggregate net transfer = Aggregate net resource flows (loan disbursements less amortization) plus official grants (non-
technical) and foreign direct investment (FDI) less interest payment and FDI profit [as defined in World Debt Tables]).
Source: Based on World Bank ‘Global Development Finance’ (2000).
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Another dimension of the structure of African debt is the changing pattern of its
creditors. Based on Table 1, it can generally be said that bilateral debt is the most
important component of the total debt. This is followed by multilateral debt. Private
inflows are showing a declining trend. A final observation is that a larger share of the
official debt is on concessional terms (see Alemayehu 1997 for detail). It is also
interesting to note that the debt problem is aggravated by capitalization of interest and
principal arrears, which constitute nearly a quarter of the external debt.
Although the share of African debt in the total debt of the developing countries is very
low, its relative burden is very high. As can be seen from Table 2 (see Alemayehu 1997
for details) the debt to GNP and debt service ratio rose from 20 per cent and 9 per cent
in 1971 to 100 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively, in 1997. Both had reach as high
as 110 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively, in the late 1980s.14 The burden of debt on
meagre resources can also be seen from net transfers to the sub-regions. It is interesting
to note from Table 2 that if grants and net foreign direct investment inflows are not
included, African countries have been transferring resources on a net basis to the
developed countries since 1985, the figure going from a low of 1.7 billion in 1985 to
nearly 7 billion in 1997. Moreover, a good part of grants (nearly 35 per cent) goes to
‘technical experts’ that came from the North.
In sum, the last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented increase in the level of
African debt. This debt is characterized by its predominant long-term nature, the
growing importance of debt owed to bilateral and multilateral creditors, a trend away
from concessionality to nonconcessionality and an increasing importance of interest
and principal arrears (usually capitalized through the Paris and London clubs) in the
growth of long-term debt. Debt burden indicators also reveal that the African debt is
extremely heavy compared to the capacity of the continent’s economies, in particular
their export sectors. Moreover, African countries in general have been characterized by
net outflows since the mid-1980s. The performance of these economies coupled with
the mounting debt surely shows that African countries are incapable of simultaneously
servicing their debt and attaining a reasonable level of economic growth, not to speak
of poverty alleviation.
Whereas the mere size of debt is not ordinarily an economic problem in itself, being
manipulated by rescheduling and similar temporary arrangements causes serious
problems with regard to its relative size to the economy (capacity level) and subsequent
impacts on the economy. In this respect three interrelated implications of the debt
problem can be singled out. First, the servicing of the external debt erodes the meagre
foreign exchange available for imports. This has led to the import compression problem
that adversely affects both public and private investments. This issue has become the
main feature of African macroeconomics. Second, the debt stock creates a debt
overhang problem that could shatter the confidence of both foreign and domestic
private investors who are usually sensitive to uncertainty. The declining trend of private
14 By and large these figures show the average scenario. However, there are some exceptions. Burundi
and Guinea-Bissau in the WCA region had a debt service ratio of 40 per cent and 94 per cent,
respectively, by 1992; Uganda and Madagascar in the ESA region had a ratio ranging from 40-70 per
cent and 50-60 per cent, respectively, from the mid-1980s. In terms of debt-to-GNP ratio,
Mozambique recorded 300-580 per cent from the mid-1980s to early 1990s; Guinea-Bissau had a
debt-to-GNP ratio of 130-300 per cent from 1980-90. Similarly, Congo and Côte d’Ivoire had a ratio
close to 200 per cent in the mid-1980s (World Bank World Debt Tables, electronic 1994).10
investment (as share of GDP) in most African countries from the late 1970s onwards
can partly be attributed to this factor. Finally, servicing of debt in the African context
induces enormous fiscal pressure, which has an adverse effect on public investment (as
can be seen from the declining share of public investment in GDP from the late 1970
onwards in most African countries) and on physical and social infrastructure. Thus, the
debt issue is a crucial part of the overall economic crisis facing Africa. The important
question is, How does this crisis come about?
The literature on the origins of the African debt crisis lists a number of factors as its
cause. The oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79, the expansion of the Eurodollar,
an upswing in public expenditure by African governments following increases in
commodity prices during the early 1970s, the recession in the industrialized world and
subsequent fall in commodity prices, as well as rises in real world interest rate are all
cited as major factors. Surprisingly, almost all of this literature focuses on the post-
independence period, with a greater part of the analysis contained therein relating to the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The main argument set out in this paper is that we need to
extend the analysis to the pre-independence period if we are adequately to explain the
current debt crisis and to propose possible solutions for its resolution. From this point
of departure, the following section traces the historical formation of the African
economic structure incapable of handling the current debt crisis.
2.3 The historical origin of Africa’s economic linkage with the industrialized
countries (the North)
Following Amin (1972), African economic history may be classified into (i) the ‘pre-
mercantilist period’ (from pre-history to the beginning of the seventeenth century);
(ii) the ‘mercantilist period’15 (from the seventeenth century to 1800) characterized by
the operation of the slave-trade; (iii) the ‘third period’ (from 1800 to 1880)
characterized by attempts to set up a European dependent African economy; and
finally, (iv) the ‘period of colonization’ in which the dependent African economy
became fully established (Amin 1972: 106). This section will not discuss the details of
Amin’s periodization. Rather, after briefly reviewing the economic history of the other
periods, it focuses mainly on the colonial period, during which time the economic
structure African countries inherited at the time of independence became established.
2.3.1African trade before Western Europe
Pre-colonial African economic interactions with the rest of the world and especially
Europe, date back many centuries before culminating in fully-fledged colonization in
the latter part of the nineteenth century.16 During the first part of this period, Africa had
autonomy in its linkages with the rest of the world17 (Amin 1972). However, during the
15 See Amin (1974: chapter 2) on the mercantilist period.
16 Amin (1972) has termed this the pre-mercantile period.
17 Wallerstein characterizes the trade of the period as trade in ‘luxuries’, with such trade being
undertaken between external arena and not in an integrated world economy framework. Wallerstein
and Amin define luxuries as those goods, the demand for which comes from the part of the profit that
is consumed. Suraffa defines luxuries as goods that are not used in the production of other goods.
However, he took it as trade/exchange in which ‘each can export to the other what is in his system
socially defined as worth little in return for the import of what in its system is defined as worth11
sixteenth century, African trade centres moved from the savannah hinterland to the
coast to reflect changes in European trade, which shifted increasingly from the
Mediterranean to the Atlantic (Hopkins 1973).
Various studies have documented how pre-colonial Africa was characterized by the
production of diversified agricultural products (see, for instance. Rodney 1972). The
internal trade of the continent was distinguished by regional complementarities with a
broad natural resource base. Thus, a dense and integrated network was set in place,
dominated by African traders, which included, inter alia, trade among herdsmen and
crop farmers, supply of exports and distribution of imports. This was dominated by
trade in salt, West African ‘spices’, perfumes, resins and kola nuts, of which the latter
was the most important (Amin 1972; Hopkins 1973; Neumark 1977; Vansina 1977;
Austen 1987). Brooks’ (1993) account of the economic conditions prevailing in this
period provides an impressive insight into African trade at the time. Specifically, one is
struck by (i) the extent of local and long-distance trade; (ii) the range of goods traded;
and, (iii) the degree of processing of commodities (for instance in textile
manufacturing, dyeing and metalworking) particularly in West Africa. According to his
account, the major commodities traded among West Africans in pre-colonial times
included salt, iron, gold, kola, and malaguetta pepper and cotton textile. Of these, kola
and malaguetta pepper were important not only in West Africa but also in the trans-
Saharan trade. Indeed, this trade was so extensive that Europeans were able to obtain
malaguetta pepper at inflated prices from Maghreb18 middlemen from at least the
fourteenth century onward (Brooks 1993). Moreover, during this period Europeans
were able to purchase cloth from Morocco, Mauritania, Senegambia, Ivory Coast,
Benin, Yorubaland and Loango for resale elsewhere (Rodney 1972; Hopkins 1973). It
is curious to note that in a geographic and economic sense, North Africa was
connected, rather than separated, by the Sahara to other parts of the continent.19 It is
also worth noting that the quality of many of these processed goods was quite
comparable with products originating in other parts of the world. For instance, the level
of manufacturing of textiles in pre-colonial West Africa was so sophisticated that these
were traded not only in West, North and Central Africa but also in the European
markets (see Hopkins 1973: 48 for detail). Moreover, none of the goods brought by
Europeans supplied any of the basic or unfulfilled needs of African societies. Indeed,
similar commodities and/or substitutes were obtainable through West African
commercial networks. Specifically, African artisans of the time manufactured high
quality iron, cotton, textiles, beers, wines and liquors (Brooks 1993). Austin argues that
this trade, sometimes referred to as the ‘Sudanic economy’, represents ‘an ideal African
development pattern: continuous and pervasive regional growth with a minimum of
dependence upon foreign partners for provision of critical goods and services’ (Austen
1987: 48). However, this autonomy in traditional industries was to be undermined by
subsequent events (Konczacki 1990).
much’. Or, in Alpers’ phrase ‘trade from which each side believed itself to be profiting’ (Wallerstein
1976: 31 and footnote 3).
18 Maghreb refers to North Africa.
19 This stands in sharp contrast to the current categorization of North Africa as geographically and
economically distinct from Sub-Saharan Africa. For a justification of this view, see Sommers and
Assefa (1992) and various IMF/World Bank classification schemes for Africa.12
Early development patterns in Africa varied among the regions. In contrast to West
Africa, East and Southern Africa (ESA) were characterized by a well-established
economic interaction with the Arabian and Asian countries, long before the arrival of
the Europeans. More specifically, this part of Africa supplied a range of products such
as gold, copper, grain, millet, and coconut to the Middle East and Indian Ocean
economies. There also existed a dynamic caravan trade and commercial plantations
long before the onset of European colonial rule. According to Austen, the towns in this
part of Africa degenerated into little more than entrepôts for raw material exports and
manufactured imports, rendering them dependent on the external economy (Austen
1987). However, as documented by Kjekshus (cited in Leys 1996), during the mid-
nineteenth century, prior to the onset of the colonial period, the interior of what is now
mainland Tanzania carried an estimated 4.5 million heads of cattle. Indeed, the entire
coastal region also supported a rich agricultural and pastoral economy (quoted in Leys
1996: 111). Further, Nzula et al. (1979)20 argue that the region was characterized by
peasant production, which was mainly a natural and closed economy with a substantial
number of people leading a nomadic existence. The existence of an independent and
autonomous economy dating back to antiquity is also well documented in Ethiopian
history.21 Amin (1972) also notes that African societies of the pre-colonial period, this
region included, developed autonomously. Thus, it can be reasonably concluded that
even though its economy was not as complex as that of West Africa, the ESA region
nevertheless had some degree of autonomy in its economic activity and was not as
dependent on the export of commodities, particularly to Europe.
To sum up, there seems to have been a long history of integrated and autonomous
economic activity in most regions of Africa with local and long-distance trade playing a
linking role. This is not an attempt to paint a ‘golden past’ for Africa. Rather, it is
meant to underline the fact that Africa had a healthy and fairly independent economic
system before colonialism intervened to force a structural interaction with Europe.
2.3.2The formation of a commodity exporting and external finance constrained
economy
The period leading up to the industrial revolution and the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries in particular witnessed the beginning of the shaping of the African economy
according to European demand. A clear example was the pressing demand for gold coin
in Europe, and the subsequent search for gold in West and Central Africa (WCA).22
20 The original work was written in 1933.
21 The commonly argued case that since Ethiopia was not colonized, it represents a ‘counter factual’ for
how other parts of Africa might have developed in the absence of colonialism is a very weak one.
First, a good part of the history of Ethiopia has been a record of wars under the ideology of either
religion, region, nationality or a combination of these. This has created a serious crisis in the
agricultural sector (see Gebrehiwot 1917). Second, Ethiopia’s past has been marked by the existence
of two clearly distinct antagonistic classes: the landed aristocracy and the peasantry, with
corresponding state structures (see Gebru 1995). Given the history of conflict that has marred
Ethiopia’s past, the main preoccupation of the landed aristocracy and the church was to maintain its
power. Third, colonialism had the effect of disrupting the dynamic caravan trade which linked the
Southwest parts of Ethiopia to the rest of the East African region. And finally, Ethiopian
independence was basically a besieged one. Since hostile and powerful colonial forces encircled the
country, this naturally had an influence on its political and economic structure. More specifically,
Ethiopia developed into a militaristic nation with a dependent economy based on the export of
commodities and import of manufactures.
22 First by the Portuguese, and later by the British, Dutch, Germans and Scandinavians.13
Indeed, the demand for labour needed for the American gold rush was instrumental in
the formation of the European slave trade (Rodney 1972). The shaping of the African
economy by Europe began even before formal colonization.
With the onset of the industrial revolution in Europe, Africa lost its remaining
autonomy and was reduced to being the supplier of slave labour for the plantations of
America (Amin 1972). The European slave trade, and the so-called ‘triangular trade’
(both of which are beyond the scope of this paper) are widely discussed issues in the
economic history of Africa. Resistance to the slave trade was silenced, not only by
co-opting local chiefs, but also by sheer force, facts which have been documented in
areas which are now Angola, Guinea and various other parts of the continent (Rodney
1972). (See also Bernstein et al. 1992 for a brief summary of the triangular trade.)
Moreover, this era witnessed a widespread expansion of European control, which was
undertaken with the dual aims of (i) incorporating new areas to primary crop
production through the use of African land and labour (which were priced below world
market prices) and (ii) increasing the level of production of existing primary
commodities. On the import side, cheaper and purer iron bars, and implements such as
knives and hoes were made available, displacing some of the previous economic
activities undertaken by local blacksmiths. This had a knock-on effect in terms of
reducing the levels of iron smelting and even a decline in the mining of iron ore
(Wallerstein 1976; Baran 1957).23
Within the ESA region, cloves grown in Zanzibar and Pemb islands for export to Asian
and European markets were the first cash crops successfully produced prior to
European colonialism. Mainland estates, dominated initially by Arab and Asian traders,
were engaged in externally oriented production through the sales of copra, sesame seed
and oil-yielding materials, with France as the principal market (Munro 1976).
Following colonization, peasant cash cropping developed in East Africa. However,
unlike in the WCA region, this was mainly the consequence of both political injunction
and regulation. Such imposition from above was usually resisted, the Maji-Maji
uprising in today’s Tanzania being a case in point. In other instances, cash cropping
simply failed to take hold, as in the case of a cotton scheme proposed for Nyanza
province in Kenya (Munro 1976). However, in spite of these initial setbacks, the
colonial powers were eventually successful in implementing their policy of introducing
cash cropping to the region.
As described above, there existed a reasonable degree of trade linkage with Europe in
the pre-colonial period. Leaving aside the slave trade, the export of primary
commodities by African colonies to Europe was the main feature of this trade. Thus,
even before the onset of the colonial era, the seeds of Africa’s subsequent role (as the
supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs for Europe, and a market for European
23 In describing the impact of underdeveloped nations’ interaction with Western Europe, Baran noted
‘[the population of these nations] found themselves in the twilight of feudalism and capitalism
enduring the worst features of both worlds. Their exploitation is multiplied, yet its fruits were not to
increase their productive wealth; these went abroad or served to support parasitic bourgeoisie at
home. They lived in abysmal misery, yet they had no prospects of a better tomorrow. They lost their
time-honoured means of livelihood, their arts and crafts, yet there was no modern industry to provide
new ones in their place. They were thrust into extensive contact with advance of the West, yet
remained in a state of the darkest backwardness’ (Baran 1957: 144). Perhaps we should not be
surprised that Baran’s description, written nearly four decades ago, remains relevant today.14
manufactures) as well as its dependence on external finance had already been sown.24
Or, to take a slightly different perspective, the progressive move from the production of
primary products to processing of these products (by Africans and in Africa) was
interrupted. This represents the first pre-designed attempt to articulate African
economic activity to the requirements of the outside world. This development was
vigorously followed up during the colonial period as a consequence of (i) the so-called
imperial self-sufficiency in raw materials scheme, (ii) the impact of the First and
Second World Wars, and (iii) financing requirements for the creation of public utilities
designed to serve (i) and (ii).
i) The imperial self-sufficiency scheme
As noted above, the export structure associated with colonialism did not arise by
accident. Instead, it was preceded by various experiments to produce agricultural
products in demand in the developing European industries. A French experiment to
produce crops similar to those produced in America, the establishment of plantations in
Senegal during the 1820s, British experiments with ‘model farms’ in Niger during the
1840s and cotton experiments25 in Senegal, Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana) all
represent cases in point (Hopkins 1973). In Germany, commercial interests persuaded
Bismarck, initially reluctant to create a colonial empire, that overseas territories could
provide raw materials for its industries as well as markets for their products (Longmire
1990). This growing demand for raw materials, the search for markets for finished
products from Europe, inter-European competition, and a number of other factors
conspired to form the basis upon which colonialism was to evolve.26
During the colonial period, one of the main phenomena which strengthened primary
commodity exports from European colonies in Africa was the so-called imperial
self-sufficiency scheme. Thus, British, French and Belgian textile industries sought to
obtain cotton from Africa and invested accordingly. A similar scheme was also
developed for tobacco. This was administered both by colonial governments and by
some European based companies (Munro 1976) and resulted in an expansion in
colonial trade. With the onset of colonialism, the centre of African trade shifted from
the hinterland to the coast, and the composition of this trade also changed in response to
the demands of the increasing external orientation of the economy (Amin 1972). For
example, expansion in the production of palm products and groundnuts was directly
linked with increased demand for inputs required in soap and candle factories,
lubricants (particularly for the railways) and European economic growth in general
(Hopkins 1973).
24 Imports of palm oil by Britain, groundnuts by France, palm kernels (for cattle cakes) by Germany and
(for the manufacturing of margarine) by the Dutch represented the main items traded during the
nineteenth century prior to the onset of formal colonialism at the end of that century (for a description
of this, see particularly Chapter 4 of Hopkins 1973).
25 These were prompted by the so-called ‘cotton famine’ in Europe, after the American Civil War.
26 The motives underlying colonialism represent a widely debated topic. For instance, Austen (1987)
argues that ‘within [the] general context of intense multifaceted international competition, the
economic rational for African colonization was to a considerable extent pre-emptive-designed to
assure access to potential rather than actual markets and commodities as well as trade routes ... to
Asia’ (Austen 1987: 116).15
At the same time, the processing of such primary products in Africa was actively
discouraged, except in white settler colonies. Indeed, this was the case even when
factories were owned by Europeans. For example, in Senegal, the proportion of
groundnuts that could be processed prior to export to France was strictly controlled
(Fieldhouse 1986; Fyfe quoted in Wallerstein 1976: 36; Onimode 1988). In Angola, the
Portuguese prevented the operation of flourmills so the country exported wheat to
Portugal and imported it back again as flour (Konczacki 1977). According to Austen
(1987), the fact that colonial governments (with the possible exception of the Union of
South Africa) saw themselves primarily as representatives of the ‘mother’ (colonial)
country benefiting from the existing pattern of trade, explains why they pursued
policies that designed to block efforts directly and indirectly at local industrialization.
In order to achieve the dual objectives of inducing the colonies to be both suppliers of
inputs and the markets for manufactured goods, various methods of coercion were
employed. Africans were forced by superior firepower to abandon small-scale
manufacturing industries and trade with rival European nations (Dickson 1977). At the
same time, large European firms were encouraged to concentrate on growing and
trading agricultural products. This was easily achieved. Specifically, African peasants
moved into cash cropping (i) to ensure access to the European goods to which they had
become accustomed in a limited way during the pre-colonial era; (ii) to earn cash which
was required to pay various taxes, and finally (iii) as a result of force.27 In certain
cases, Africans were simply exterminated to pave the way for settlers.28 In other parts
of the continent, Europeans directly controlled the production of such commodities as
cotton, sugarcane and tobacco (Amin 1972). Indeed, in some areas such as British East
Africa, the law required farmers to grow a minimum acreage of cash crops. However,
these peasants were not wholly dependent on cash crop production. They also produced
food for own consumption, this being an advantage to big firms, as it enabled them to
pay only minimal wages which did not have to cover maintenance of the labourer and
his family (Rodney 1972). Nevertheless, colonial authorities ascertained that the extent
of such food production was not adequate for self-sufficiency. For instance, in British
Guinea it was a criminal offence to grow rice (at a time when it was imported from
India and Burma) because it was feared that this could divert labour from the sugar
plantations (Frankel 1977). Thus, in this manner Africa’s economic role basically as a
producer of primary commodities continued to be shaped to serve Europe’s industrial
and commercial interests.
ii) The First and Second World Wars
The impact of World War I was devastating on the African colonies. Although trade
was disrupted during the period, African colonies were nevertheless forced to supply
commodities to finance the war. The end of the war was followed by a surge in major
commodity prices and hence high export earnings for the colonies (Munro 1976).
27 There are many examples of Africans being forced into cash crop production. This occurred in
Tanganyika (today’s mainland Tanzania), in the Portuguese colonies, in French Equatorial Africa and
French Sudan (Mali). In Congo’s Brazzaville, the French enforced cotton cultivation by banning
traditional agricultural activities. These policies of coercion were resisted to the extent possible. The
revolts in Tanganyika and Angola represent cases in point (see Rodney 1972; Austen 1987).
28 This was the policy followed by Germany in what is now Namibia. Indeed, the extermination of
Africans was so extensive that when they discovered diamonds, the Germans had to look for migrant
labour from other regions (see Longmire 1990).16
Similarly, World War II resulted in an increased demand for primary commodities,
especially those with strategic military importance such as vegetable oils, metals and
industrial diamonds (Munro 1976; Burdette 1990). This had the effect of reinforcing
the commodity producing and exporting role of the European colonies in Africa. In
addition to the direct effects of the war, the post-war reconstruction of Europe, rising
levels of European incomes and removal of restrictions on consumer demand and
commodity stockpiling engendered by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950,
resulted in the price of African exports surging to unprecedented heights (Munro 1976).
Consequently, when war erupted or was expected to erupt in the colonizing countries,
commodity production and exports by African colonies were boosted by non-price
mechanisms. Further, the end of the war was usually also followed by a commodity
price boom and an increase in the export of commodities, this time through the
operation of the price mechanism. In the process, the specialization of the European
settlements in Africa as producers and exporters of primary commodities became
firmly established.
iii) Financing public utilities and commodity export
In general, in the pre-1929 international financial order which was dominated by
government bonds (i.e. portfolio investment), Asian and African colonies had little
choice with regard to the nature of their involvement in international financial systems.
Political considerations were at the heart of access regulation to capital markets (Bacha
and Alejandro 1982). Besides, such inflows to Africa were generally negligible (UN
1949). Capital inflows from World War II (WWII) onward were increasingly in the
form of foreign direct investment (FDI). There was a moderate flow of such capital
from the United States and Britain to Africa. However, such investment (especially
investment originating in the United States, which was the largest supplier) was
concentrated mainly in South Africa, Egypt and Liberia, the latter relating to the
introduction of a shipping line by the United States (UN 1954). In almost all cases, the
investment went into plantations and mineral extraction (UN 1949).
The colonial period also witnessed a flow of loans and grants from European centres to
the African colonies. These funds were mostly spent on public infrastructure
development such as railways and roads to link ports to export production sites, and, to
a lesser extent, on schools and health facilities. This was undertaken with the aim of
developing the primary commodity-exporting capacity of the colonies (see UN 1954).
In some circumstances the colonial powers were also motivated by military strategic
considerations. It is estimated that from the mid-1940s to 1960, only 15 to 20 per cent
of such inflows were allocated for social and production sectors, while the rest went
into infrastructural development (Munro 1976). The nature of these financial flows to
the colonies also differed before and after World War II. In general, it can be said that
the pre-WWII flows came mainly in loan form, while the post-World War flows, and
especially those from France, increasingly incorporated a grant element (see also
Austen 1987: 197-202 for details). However, the repayment of this debt created serious
difficulties to the colonial administrators.
These financial difficulties were exacerbated by the instability in the global commodity
market and the resultant vulnerability of the African colonies. Indeed, various analogies
may be drawn between the current debt crisis and the situation then. For instance, after
the Great Depression (1929-32), African exports declined by about 42 per cent. The
depression also resulted in a contraction of the credit flowing to the colonies, leading to17
a serious incapacity to service debt owed to the ‘mother’ (colonizing) country. Since
colonies were not in a position to default on these debts, there was effectively no way
out for them. This had repercussions for every African economy, with widespread bank
failures, retrenchment programmes in colonial administrations and liquidation of
businesses (see Munro 1976: 150-3 for details).
Setting off a vicious cycle, the financial difficulties being experienced by colonial
governments forced the colonies to vigorously follow a policy of producing export
commodities at the expense of other alternatives (Munro 1976; Austen 1987). Peasant
cropping, with its attractive minimum cost for colonial governors, was chosen as a
convenient vehicle to address the problem. This, the so-called the ‘peasant path’ to
financial solvency, became a universal phenomenon throughout the colonies, and
especially in the present day WCA. It was attained by the forced involvement of
ordinary peasants in the primary commodity export sector. At times this coercion was
so harsh that ordinary peasants were not paid in cash, but in bills of credit to the
administration’s head tax (Munro 1976). In the British colonies of East Africa a similar
emphasis on the ‘peasant path’ was also followed (Munro 1976).
In summary, with the processes discussed above the foundations for the existing
economic structure of African countries were laid down during the colonial period.
This was achieved through two channels; first, by directly contributing to the expansion
of an enclave of primary commodity-exporting economies. And second, by bringing
about a situation of indebtedness, it further accentuated the importance of these
activities as the source of foreign exchange required for settling the debt. Although this
general pattern was applied throughout the African colonies, some variations existed
across the regions. The next section addresses this issue.
2.3.3The three macroregions of colonial Africa: the Amin-Nzula category
Although colonialism shaped the production structure in a similar pattern across Africa,
one may nevertheless observe certain variations between different macroregions.
Leaving aside North Africa, Nzula et al. (1937)29 and Amin (1972) divide the continent
into three distinct regions based on their colonial structure:
i) Africa of the labour reserves (Nzula et al. 1979 label this ‘East and Southern
Africa’);
ii) Africa of the colonial economy (Nzula et al. label this the ‘British and French
West Africa’): and
iii) Africa of the concession-owning companies (Nzula et al. label this the
‘Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa’).
The fundamental distinction between these regions is derived from the manner in
which the colonial powers settled the ‘land question’(Nzula et al. 1979: 36).
In West Africa, commodity production did not take the form of plantations.
Furthermore, the mineral wealth of the region remained largely untapped until quite
recently (Amin 1972: 115). The amount of African peasant land expropriated was also
negligible (Nzula et al. 1979). However, in spite of this, the control and growth of the
29 The English translation appeared in 1979.18
commodity sector was governed by European interests, while land remained in the
hands of small peasants. The mechanisms for this control were as much political as
economic (Amin 1972). Hopkins lists a number of reasons why plantation-based
production never became fully established in West Africa. First, some traders were
opposed to plantations for fear that they might compete with the export sector for
scarce capital (such objections were voiced, for example, by businessmen such as Lever
and Verdier). Second, the few plantations that were established, failed because of lack
of capital and ignorance about tropical conditions. The third and perhaps most
important reason was that small peasants had already succeeded in forming an export
economy on their own. Moreover, establishing plantations would have created conflict
with traditional land rights. Furthermore, some crops such as groundnuts would not
have been suited to plantation agriculture (Hopkins 1973). Finally, it is worth pointing
out that it was not necessary to develop formal plantation agriculture, since it was
possible to influence the nature of production and control the export supply of peasants
through monopolistic trading practices, customs restrictions, fiscal controls and
appropriate credit arrangements (Nzula et al. 1979).30
In much of today’s Central Africa and part of Southern Africa, concessionaire
companies, usually supported by their European state, dominated the entire economic
structure through their involvement in mining, fishing, public works and
communication, and even taxation (see Seleti 1990). In these regions, the indigenous
population was reduced to semi-slavery, and exploited by open and non-economic
forms of coercion on the plantations and mines (Nzula et al. 1979; Austen 1987). The
establishment of these concessionaire companies was further facilitated by the
indigenous population fleeing and seeking refuge in the more inaccessible parts of the
region. Discouraged by this population exodus, the colonial authorities encouraged
adventurer companies to ‘try to get something out of the region’ (Amin 1972: 117). The
activities of these companies were organized in line with the needs of the ‘mother
country’. One example of this was the demand for raw materials required in the
European war effort. Thus, the mining companies, in cooperation with colonial
officials, designed and determined the nature of their enclave activity to meet the
increased demand for copper and other base metals required by the European war
industries (Burdette 1990).
In Southern and Eastern Africa, both systems referred to above were intricately
interwoven with a number of specific features (Nzula et al. 1979). In this region, steps
were taken, frequently by force, to create a small—and often insufficient—reserve of
labour comprising land-owning peasants and the urban unemployed to meet the labour
demands of mineral extraction and settler agriculture (Amin 1972; Nzula et al. 1979).
This labour was further supplemented by interregional migration. Other economic
instruments, such as taxation, were also used to create reserve labour for European
plantations and mining (Seleti 1990; Konczacki 1977). The reduction of the cost of
labour in such regions to mere subsistence levels rendered the exports of the colonies
competitive compared to similar goods produced in Europe. Clearly, the formulation of
such a structure was ‘as much political as economic’31 (Amin 1972: 115; Seleti
30 See also Amin (1972) for a political and social analysis of how the region’s commodity production
and exports were controlled.
31 Pim (1977) places this at the centre of his investment analysis and argues that the main investment
was in areas with extensive mineral wealth, plantation possibilities and a mass of unskilled labour.
This involved heavy expenditure in communications, which required an expansion of the export19
1990: 47). However, since the focus of this paper is on the economic aspect, we will
not dwell on such political considerations here. Rather, we simply observe that during
this period, an economic structure was set in place, which became characterized by the
export of primary commodities.
By the end of the colonial period, what had been achieved in all these macroregions
was the creation of a commodity-exporting economy and virtual monopoly of the
African trade (both import and export) by Europe (see Hopkins 1973). The commodity
export-led strategy was vigorously followed during this period. As a result, not only did
production for overseas markets expand at a high rate, but also several new items
(especially foodstuffs) began to appear on the import list (Hopkins l973). In some
cases, European business interests were so pervasive that they created a protected
market for dumping their manufactured goods.32 Summarizing the stylized facts of the
colonial period, Konczacki describes the economic pattern of what is called ‘matured’
colonialism33 as having three distinct components. First, both imports (which were
mainly manufactured goods) and exports (mainly raw materials) were fixed with the
mother country. Second, capital investment in the colony was determined according to
the trading interest of the mother country, and concentrated in the exporting enclaves.
Finally, a supply of cheap labour was ensured through a variety of mechanisms (legal,
monopolistic employment and through other economic instruments [Konczacki 1977]).
Indeed, it is worth noting that this pattern has not changed fundamentally even today.
Another important characteristic of this period relates to technological change. For
example, if one focuses on cotton production, during the colonial era Africa
... was concentrating almost entirely on export of raw cotton and the
import of manufactured cotton cloth. This remarkable reversal
[compared to the pre-colonial period] is tied to technological advance in
Europe and to stagnation of technology in Africa owing to the very trade
with Europe (Rodney 1972: 113).
Colonialism further exacerbated this situation. As Amin notes, when we speak of the
exchange of agricultural products against imported manufacture (i.e. the terms of
trade), ‘the concept is much richer: it describes analytically the exchange of agricultural
commodities provided by a peripheral society shaped in this [colonial] way against the
product of a central capitalist industry (imported or produced on the spot by European
enterprises)’ (1972: 115).
To sum up, it has been shown that African nations already possessed an integrated and
autonomous economic structure prior to their intensive interactions with Europeans
during the colonial period. It is hard to speculate what the future of such a structure
might have been in the absence of colonialism. However, it goes without saying that it
would not have been what it is now, since the present is clearly the result of a specific
sector for its finance. The latter, in turn, required a large labour supply, which was secured by direct
and indirect compulsion, affecting every aspect of native life.
32 France was in possession of such a protected market in West Africa. The protectionist policy was the
result of pressure from the French metallurgical, textile and chemical industries, which had difficulty
competing with Britain (Hopkins 1973). Portuguese industrialists had also created such protected
markets in Africa, especially for their textile industry (Seleti 1990).
33 Portuguese colonialism does not qualify as ‘matured’ in his analysis.20
historical process. More specifically, historical interaction with today’s developed
countries has shaped the structure of the economic activity of African nations,
particularly in the areas of international trade and finance. Indeed, economic
domination, accompanied by colonization, has further cemented this structure. Given
such a historical process, it is not surprising to find that almost all African nations had
become exporters of a limited range of primary products, and importers of
manufactured goods by the time of independence in the 1960s.34 This was further
compounded by a demand for external finance, when export earnings were not
sufficient to finance the level of public expenditures required for maintaining and
expanding the commodity-exporting economy. This structure has not changed in any
meaningful way in the post-colonial era. Thus, when one examines the financial
problems of Africa (which, I am arguing, relate to its role as a primary commodity
exporter) one is compelled to conclude that these problems are a direct outcome of its
historical process.
3 The implication for the post-independence period
In the previous section I have explained how a primary commodity and external finance
dependent economy was created in Africa. The impact of the subsequent (after political
independence) events—the boom in commodity prices, the oil price shocks of 1973-74
and 1978-79 and the evolution of African debt from the early 1970s onward—would be
difficult to understand unless an explicit link is made between the historically formed
structure and the pattern of trade and finance in the decades 1970-90. This section
briefly summarizes the phenomenon. This evolution of African trade and finance in the
post-independence period can be categorized under three periods.
3.1 The late 1960s and early 1970s
The first period refers to the late 1960s and early 1970s, and is marked by the first oil
shock and the rise in commodity prices. The commodity price boom is followed by a
sharp bust in 1974 and again after the 1977 coffee and cocoa boom (Figures 1 and 2).
The response in most African countries was a rise in government expenditure, in the
infrastructure sector in particular. When commodity prices fell, governments were
unable to cut expenditure but were also in need of maintaining on-going projects. This
was accompanied by increased borrowing resulting from improved credit worthiness,
as export commodity prices rise and a belief in the cyclical nature of prices when these
decline. This pattern is examined and can be seen from the development of trade and
finance in the sample countries included in this study.35 (See Alemayehu 1997 for
details). The major point that emerges is that following the rise in commodity prices
and access to loans, there was a rise in public expenditure. Given the inherited colonial
34 In virtually all African countries, one to three commodities account for 50-90 per cent of total
exports. Indeed, in the period 1982-86, it was one product in 13 African countries, two products in 8
countries, three products in 6 countries, and finally four products in 8 African countries that
accounted for over 75 per cent of export earning (see Adedeji 1993 for details).
35 This list includes Zambia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Egypt (see
Alemayehu 1997 for detailed information about the evolution of the pattern of trade and finance since
1970 in each of these counties picked from each macroregion outlined in this paper).21
structure which necessitated spending on social and physical infrastructure, the increase
in government expenditure (and the beginning of debt creation) was not a policy
mistake, as seems to be depicted in the good part of the African debt literature. This
spending is necessitated by fundamental problems, which are structural/historical and
the resulting policies are the reflection of this fact (see Alemayehu 1997).
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Source: Alemayehu (1997).22
The above analysis shows that the period 1970 to the mid-1970s was characterized by a
rise in the price of commodities on which African countries had specialized for
historical reasons. It was also a period during which the imports of capital and
intermediate goods (mainly to develop infrastructure) increased. This effort was
complemented by foreign borrowing. It is at this particular juncture that almost all
countries were hit by the first oil price shock. The resulting shock was tackled in part
by resorting to external financing, as in the case of Ghana, Zambia, Sierra Leon, and
many other countries. The same was true in Kenya (although the price of coffee rose in
the first half of 1970s but fell in the second half, causing Kenya to finance its
balance-of-payment deficit with a rise in private capital inflow). Malawi also
experienced similar problems and private capital inflows (especially of supplier’s
credit) were important in solving the balance-of-payment difficulties. Another way of
viewing the latter phenomenon is to consider the additional external finance (which
eventually turned into debt) requirements as a policy response to the external shocks
the African countries were facing (see Balassa 1983 and 1984; Hardy 1986; Ezenwe
1993). The question is whether such policy responses were rational. Should the shock
be seen as a temporary one? These shocks were believed by both the African
governments and the creditors to be temporary. Given this belief (that is, the
expectation of an eventual rise in commodity prices) and given the then prevailing low
real interest rate (which was even negative, see Khan and Knight 1983), it seems
reasonably rational that both lenders and borrowers responded in the same way. As it
turned out, the frustration of these expectations (secular decline in commodity price and
rise in real world interest rate) placed an enormous burden on Africa and not on
northern creditors.36
In all these cases, the rise in commodity prices during this period was followed by an
increase in government expenditure. True, there were also domestic policy problems in
managing public expenditure, but the nature of public expenditure did not constitute
reckless spending, as is usually implicitly implied in the African debt literature. For
instance after the first oil boom, nearly 80 per cent of public expenditure in Nigeria was
earmarked for physical and social infrastructure. Capital expenditure was twice that of
current expenditure. Public expenditure on trade, industry and mining rose from 7.3 per
cent in 1970-74 to 26 per cent in 1975-80, transport from 21.3 per cent to 22.2 per cent
in the two periods while general administration dropped from 22 per cent to 13.6 per
cent (Mohammed 1989).37 Current expenditure in Zambia, contrary to Nigeria, was
nearly 75 per cent of total expenditure in 1970-74 and this is largely attributed to the
Zambianaization policy, which was dictated by the inherited colonial structure (see
Mwale 1983). Nonetheless, from 1972 (strengthened in 1974) the government
attempted to curb current expenditure. For instance, consumer durable import was
reduced from 28 per cent in 1974 to 18 per cent in 1978. Similarly, subsidies with the
attending political costs had been reduced in the early 1970s (Mwale 1983). In general
by the mid-1970s, public and private consumption had been substantially reduced from
its high 1970 level (Mulalu 1987). In Sudan the rise in government expenditure after
36 The situation was a little different for oil exporters (see Alemayehu 1997 for details).
37 This investment was not without results, either. After this expenditure, almost universal primary
education was achieved, more health infrastructures were built, and infant mortality rate declined by
more than a third. However, the public enterprises built were seriously affected by the recession in
the North, high import content (59-60 per cent), and lack of domestic demand which adversely
affected their capacity to be self-sufficient (see Mohammed 1989).23
the early 1970s was largely due to decentralization, infrastructure development and
debt servicing (Galil 1994), a pattern similar to many African countries (see
Alemayehu 1997 for detail).
Consequently, following the rise in commodity prices and access to loans there was
also a rise in public expenditure. However, this in itself was not a mistake. The
expenditure was not reckless, given the inherited colonial structure that necessitated
spending on social and physical infrastructure to address the hitherto neglected sections
of the population, the prevailing hope in technology transfer through import
substitution, and the uncertainly about commodity prices. In fact in most African
countries, the relative share of functional expenditure hardly changed after the general
commodity boom in 1973-74 and the 1976-77 boom for cocoa and coffee exporters.
Capital expenditure changed, however, because of the import substitution strategy
pursued (see Alemayehu 1997). In retrospect, it could be perceived as a policy problem,
but it is difficult to expect these infant government structures (they themselves being
the result of a unique historic process) would have had full foresight of the commodity
price decline.38 Even if they had had this insight, the root cause of the problem was the
deterioration of the terms of trade. The policy problem that emanated from the failure
to predict the commodity price collapse and manage demand was a secondary one. This
argument, however, should not be taken as an endorsement of the white elephant
investments carried in some African countries. Perhaps the major domestic policy
problem associated with the rising expenditure was the way in which the import
substitution (IS) strategy was conducted. While the IS strategy was a sound one, it was
carried out in the context of a disarticulated production and consumption structure. The
latter in particular is vivid in the neglect of the industrial and agricultural linkages (as it
was based on the urban elite’s patterns of consumption); future demands for recurrent
cost of intermediate inputs; and development of the human capital required. However,
the fundamental problems were structural/historical and the resulting policies are
therefore a reflection of this reality and hence secondary in their effect.39
38 Even an international institution like the IMF which was supervising the economic evolution of some
countries (Zambia) did not foresee some of the events, let alone the then-governments of Africa.
Observing this, Mulalu (1987) noted the irony of IMF’s blame of the Zambian government, despite
its close monitoring of the country since 1975.
39 One common observation is that certain East Asian countries under colonial rule (Korea, Singapore
and Hong Kong) have developed while Africa has not. Such comments are not credible because the
historical parallel is completely different. Hong Kong and Singapore prospered as entrepôts due to
direct British colonial interest. Moreover, they are city-states, not comparable to African colonies.
Probably the only comparable country is Korea and, to some degree, Taiwan. However, the Japanese
colonialism (which was as harsh as the others) aimed at creating heavy industry and self-sufficiency
in its empire and has thus done better than the colonizers in Africa. Some figures may substantiate
this point. Taiwan and Korea experienced higher GDP growth than their colonizer (Japan) between
1911-39; their infrastructure developed (Taiwan at independence had 600 kilometres of rails and
3,553 kilometres of road where there were none before). By the end of the colonial period, primary
school enrolment in Taiwan stood at 71 per cent and a similar pattern is observed in Korea. Owing to
geopolitical factors (the Cold War) Korea, for instance, obtained US $6 billion in grants from USA
between 1946-78 compared to US $6.89 billion for the whole of Africa. US military deliveries to the
two countries in 1955-78 stood at US $9 billion, compared to the combined figure of US $3.2 billion
for Latin America—one can imagine what the economic impact of this might have been (see
Chowdhury and Islam 1993). In Korea alone, aid financed nearly 70 per cent of total imports and
equalled to 75 per cent of total fixed capital formation (see Haggard 1990 which also provides the
political economy of this event). Hopefully, the above facts show that the Asian experience cannot be
compared to the situation in Africa.24
This pattern was compounded by another development in the global financial markets.
The oil price hikes not only forced oil importers to become more dependent on
borrowing, they also created what is called the OPEC surplus-pax Arabica (Bacha and
Alejandro 1982). This surplus was circulated through the international banking system.
The Euromarket became an important source of financing for a number of African
countries, which had never borrowed before (Krumm 1985; Mistry 1988). The situation
was reinforced by the second oil price shock (Kruger 1987 and Salazar-Carrillo 1988
cited in Taiwo 1991; Ezenwe 1993). The new borrowed funds were spent on mining
companies and major public projects. But in general these loans were characterized by
harder terms. When the second oil price hike came in the late 1970s, with commodity
prices continuously deteriorating (Figures 1 and 2), most countries were unable to
absorb the shock (Krumm 1985), and by the end of the decade, total external debt had
grown almost ten fold.40
3.2 The late 1970s and early 1980s
The second period refers to the late 1970s and early 1980s. The end of the 1970s had
witnessed the second oil price shock.41 Major commodity prices continued to decline,
prompted, inter alia, by the recession in the industrial countries. The early 1980s were
also characterized by an increase in real interest rate in the industrial world, chiefly due
to the lax fiscal and tight monetary policy of the US.42 By 1981, the real foreign
interest rate was 17.4 per cent compared to -17.9 per cent in 1973 (see Khan and Knight
1983: 2). The latter aggravated the interest rate cost of the nonconcessional and private
debts that became increasingly important during this period (see Alemayehu 1997 for
detail). This development prompted many African governments to continue borrowing
(and get credit) on the assumption of a cyclical turn-around in commodity prices. These
new loans were used to finance enlarged oil bills and to avoid sharp politically/socially
disruptive cutbacks in public expenditure (Mistry 1988). The experiences of most
countries (Ghana, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Libya and Nigeria,
discussed in detail in Alemayehu 1997) during this period generally confirm this
pattern.
3.3 The late 1980s to the 1990s
The third period refers to the late 1980s to the 1990s. This period, similarly to the late
1970s, was marked by continually declining commodity prices and the deterioration of
40 However, Taiwo (1991) using regression analysis based on data from eleven sub-Saharan African
countries (1970-88) noted that the most important factor for the debt crisis was the relative (periphery
to centre) level of economic development (measured as the ratio of per capita income of LDC to
industrial world) and, to a lesser degree, terms of trade, relative prices, real cost of borrowing and
openness of the economy.
41 However, collapse of the oil price from its 1979 peak, although revitalizing the oil-importing
countries, adversely affected the oil-exporting economies of North Africa and some of the countries
in West and Central African regions (mainly Nigeria).
42 Furthermore, the terms for African countries were harder than even those for South Asian countries.
For instance, African countries in 1980 paid an average interest rate of 6.6 per cent on loans with an
18-year maturity. The comparable figures for South Asian countries were 3.1 per cent and 30 years
(van der Hoeven 1993: 1).25
terms of trade. For the period 1985-90 when a large number of African countries
undertook adjustment programmes, the deterioration in the barter terms of trade of nine
major export commodities resulted in a 40 per cent decline in average export revenue
(compared to 1977-79 average) despite a 75 per cent increase in export volume (Husain
1994: 168). As a result, African countries became more vulnerable to further
indebtedness. Moreover, the capitalization of amortization and interest payment
through the Paris and London clubs rescheduling had also started pushing the debt
stock upward (van der Hoeven 1993 and Alemayehu 1997). This pattern is obvious
from the reports of many countries examined in detail in Alemayehu (1997).
Given this general pattern from the mid-1980s to early 1990s, African economies had
become extremely indebted by the 1990s. Moreover, apart from investment in
infrastructure (like the transport sector) which needed external finance for its
maintenance, almost all countries had become dependent on external finance for
securing imported intermediate inputs and ensuring the smooth functioning of their
economy. (See Ndulu 1986; Ngwenya and Bugembe 1987; Fantu 1992; Rattso 1992a
and 1992b; Mbelle and Sterner 1991). Thus, throughout the two decades analysed, the
value of imports was persistently increasing in most countries.43 This recurrent import-
demand problem was compounded by actual running down of the capital stock,
including infrastructure.
Thus by late 1980s and early 1990s, such historically structured economies in Africa
were vulnerable to events such as the recession of the industrialized economies,
following the global monetary shock of 1979-81, which depressed commodity prices.
This was also a time when the world economy witnessed (i) the emergence of high,
positive real interest rate throughout the 1980s which increased the debt service burden
of indebted countries, (ii) protectionism in the world market for agricultural products
and low technology manufacturing which hampered diversification attempts, and
finally, (iii) the prevalence of repeated official and private rescheduling, often at
punitive terms (see Mistry 1991: 10-11 for detail). This crisis increased the role of
multilateral finance despite the unacceptable terms—policy conditionality. Thus,
another major development in the 1980s and early 1990s was the growth of multilateral
debt, especially that owed to the World Bank and African Development Bank and, to a
lesser degree, the IMF. The main reasons for an increase in debt owed to multilateral
agencies were (i) the stepping-in of these multilateral banks to finance the partial
bailout of commercial banks in the 1980s (see Alemayehu 1997 for detail), (ii) the fact
that these debts were denominated in SDR and ECU while most African countries
earned their currency in US dollars, which had depreciated against both SDR and ECU
for the last 30 years44 and finally (iii) the growth of adjustment financing (Mistry 1994
43 An interesting area of further study is to explore the impact of services (especially insurance and
shipping), which seriously affected a number of small countries in Africa.
44 According to Mistry (1996) if this fact is taken into account, one needs to question the
concessionality of this debt. For instance, the effective average annual exchange-risk adjusted cost of
a concessional debt in US dollars may be 4-6 per cent annually instead of the 1 per cent or lower
coupon rate that such a debt nominally carries. Besides, the residual principal value of the
concessional debt, which needs to be repaid, had increased by between 30-45 per cent in US dollar
terms, aggravating the debt servicing problem of African countries. Thus, if the concessional loan is
borrowed in US dollars in the first place, it is as expensive as the market debt. This exchange rate
effect not only effectively reduces the concessionality of such debt (from 80 per cent, which donors
usually say, to 40-50 per cent) but also makes African countries vulnerable to the macroeconomic
policies of the industrialized countries (Mistry 1996: 26).26
and 1996). In sum, African countries by the 1990s found themselves not only being
extremely indebted but also structurally unable to pay back their debt.
4 Conclusions
The descriptive analysis at the beginning of this paper reveals that the current level of
debt is beyond the capacity of the continent to service, indicating that the insolvency
issue is at the heart of the African debt crisis. Various contending explanations on the
causes of the problems of Africa’s external economy in general and its external finance
in particular have been put forward in the literature. These range from explanations that
emphasize policy as the main problem to those that favour historically formed
structures. A third view focuses on the systemic nature of the crisis. The recent
literature on the origins of African debt problems limits itself largely to the events of
the 1970s and late 1980s. Certainly these are crucial but explain only part of the story.
The analysis of the African debt crisis needs a historical review to explain how a weak
and vulnerable economic structure was created as the result of Africa’s specialization as
a primary commodity exporter. I have shown that this was the case in Africa. Such an
analysis also explains how this structure paved the way for indebtedness by creating the
necessity for borrowing and by making debt servicing difficult.
It is interesting to ask whether the financial, physical, human and institutional ‘capital’
inventories from the colonial era have somewhat reproduced themselves in the last
three decades. Undoubtedly, the answer is yes. There are at least four fundamental
reasons for this. First, the demand from the previous colonial powers and hence the
pattern of trade and finance has not changed fundamentally. By 1988, for instance,
88 per cent of Sub-Saharan export went to Europe (see Sommers and Assefa 1992 for
details). This old division of labour was strengthened by what is called the Lomé
Convention (see Amin 1996). Second, the new agents that came to power after
‘independence’ attempted diversification. This was largely a failure not only because of
the conceptualization of the whole process, notably the disarticulation of agriculture
and industry, but also because fundamentally such efforts required huge investments,
which were beyond the capacity of these post-independence agents. This severely
limited the policy options available. Third, despite the post-‘independence’
reconciliation of both political radicals45 and the moderates46 to the African
perspective by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and hence the OAU formation in
1963 (see Amin 1996), their subsequent existence in power is informed by
maximization of short-run gains subject to the constraint of inherited trade and financial
structure. This necessarily implies reliance on primary commodities and loans instead
of structural transformation. Finally, since the mid-1980s (for some countries even
earlier) the economy of Africa was essentially (mis)managed by the Bank and the Fund
which itself is a failure (see Adam 1995; Lall 1995; Mosley and Weeks 1993; Mosley
et al. 1995, ECA 1989b among others). It is within this broader framework that the
45 That is to say, radical departure from colonial pattern-Casablanca (Nasserism, Algerian FLN,
Nkrumahism and to a degree followers of Lupumba).
46 That is to say, adaptation to the pattern-Monrovia groups (Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya being the main
ones).27
specific problem of the African external finance and debt crisis and its macroeconomic
ramifications should be understood.
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